INTRODUCTION
The threshold issue in American products liability litigation is whether the product was defective at the time it left the manufacturer's controI.l Traditionally, courts and scholars define "defect" in three functional categories: manufacturing defects, design defects and marketing defects. 2 American products liability doctrine employs two major tests to determine whether a "defect" exists: the seller-oriented risk-utility test and the buyer-oriented consumer expectations test. 3 The Draft adoption of the consumer-oriented test for European strict products liability cases. ' This article analyzes these contemporary developments. First, it considers the implications of the European Union's (EU) Council Directive No. 85/374 (European Directive) for American products liability law. It then analyses the consumer expectations test in light of the purpose of products liability law. Reconsideration of the consumer expectations test suggests that, properly constructed and applied, the consumer-oriented test promotes considerations of safety, equity, and efficiency.
I. THE EUROPEAN DIRECTIVE AND AMERICAN PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAw

A. Strict Liability and Consumer Expectations
As the EU moves toward implementation of strict liability for defective products, American products liability law is reevaluating its legal and social significance. s Like most laws, strict products liability embodies a codification of social policy.9 As between the manufacturer who brings the product to market and the buyer who uses it as intended, who is more responsible for the product? Who is in the better financial position to pay for product injuries? Strict liability theory places these costs on the manufacturer even though he or she is without fault or liability under traditional negligence or warranty concepts. IO Even the non-negligent manufacturer is morally responsible since he or she designed, tested and manufactured the product; he or she placed it into the marketplace.
ll From an economic point of view, strict liability makes two assumptions. First, the manufacturer made a profit from a particular product, and on all similar products sold. I2 Second, if the manufacturer pays for the damages caused by his or her product, he or she can pass the costs on to the consuming public through higher prices. 13 Spreading the cost created by a relatively small number of defective products across the cost of all units sold should result in only minor price increases to the consuming public.
I4
Strict products liability is designed to promote both safety and fairness. I5 In fact, the original purpose for adopting strict products liability was to relieve the injured consumer from the enormous burdens of proving either negligence or the overly technical requirements of warranty. 16 The primary rationale behind this doctrine is that, since the manufacturer profits from product sales, he or she should pay for any damage caused by that product. I7 Paying for accidents becomes a cost of doing business. IS [strict] liability is to insure that the costs of injuries resulting from defective products are borne after all true production costs, including safety costs, are paid will remain on the market. 19 Under a true strict liability regime, recovery depends neither on manufacturer fault nor negligence, but on the manufacturer's responsibility for the product which caused "injury."2o In this sense, the manufacturer bears ultimate responsibility for product safety.21 Criticizing strict liability doctrine for failing, in an efficient way, to produce safe products ignores the issue of moral responsibility.22 Admittedly, strict liability may make manufacturers more careful, thereby creating safer products. 23 Such product safety, however, complements the predominate goal: assuring that manufacturers pay the actual costs of product injuries. 24 The only significant inquiry for strict liability analysis is who should pay these costs. 25 Clearly, accident costs not paid by the manufacturer necessarily fall on the injured party.26 As between the manufacturer, who places the defective product on the market, and the injured party, the manufacturer should bear the immediate, direct financial responsibility.27 Ultimately, consumers as a whole underwrite the cost of product injury in the loss-spreading price increases passed on to them by the manufacturer. 28 As a result, the market price of a by the manufacturers that put such products on the market rather than by the injured persons who are powerless to protect themselves."); w. Page Keeton, Product Liability and the Meaning oj DeJect,5 ST. MARY's LJ. 30, 35 (1973) ("A fourth and perhaps major reason ordinarily given for strict liability in this area is that those engaged in the manufacturing enterprise can serve effectively as risk distributors accepting responsibility for accident losses attributable to the dangerousness of products as a cost of doing business.").
product reflects the true cost of that product, including accident costs.
29
Examination of the historical underpinnings of strict products liability reveals that the original § 402A possesses a decidedly pro-consumer orientation. 30 Strict liability for defective products was intended to relieve the injured consumer from the burdensome requirements of proving either negligence or breach of warranty.31 Historically, the consumer expectations test is the natural, logical result of strict products liability as the extension of implied warranty law. 32 Recognition of the protection of reasonable consumer product safety expectations essentially dictates the adoption of the consumer expectations test. ss
B. The European Directive and the Consumer Expectations Test
The European approach to consumer expectations owes much to American products liability doctrine. In turn, it can be a corrective reminder that reasonable consumer expectations have a central position in products liability analysis. In part, the European Directive resulted from the demand for product safety following the thalidomide tragedy in Europe during the 1960s.34 An additional reason for its implementation was the need to harmonize the differing national rules for products liability for economic reasons. A single strict liability 29 See, e.g., David 
Id.
Many courts have used consumer expectations as a criteria for defining defect. If a consumer reasonably expects a product to be safe to use for a purpose, the product is defective if it does not meet those expectations. The consumer expectations test is natural since strictliabilily in tort developed from the law of warranty. The law ofimplied warranty is vitally concerned with protecting justified expectations since this is a fundamental policy of the law of contracts. regime would place all tvvelve Member States on an equal footing, eliminating the risk that consumers would receive differing amounts of protection or that producers in Member States having stricter regimes would be financially disadvantaged. 35 Before the European Directive, the products liability laws of the individual Member States varied greatly. Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain maintained traditional negligence systems with the plaintiff retaining the traditional burden of proof. 36 Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Ireland and the United Kingdom had a presumption of liability shifting the burden of proof to the defendant, which resembled strict liability.37 Belgium, Greece and Luxembourg had absolute strict liability regimes. 42 Article 6 of the European Directive provides:
1. A product is defective when it does not provide the safety which a person is entitled to expect, taking all circumstances into account, including: (a) the presentation of the product; (b) the use to which it could reasonably be expected that the product would be put; [and] (c) the time when the product was put into circulation. 2. A product shall not be considered defective for the sole reason that a better product is subsequently put into circulation. 43 The European Directive imposes strict liability through its definition of "defect." Article 6(1)'s definition of defect is modeled on the consumer expectations test of § 402A comment i to the Restatement (Second) of Torts. 44 Comment i provides the basis of the consumer expectation test by stating that a product is defective if it is "dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics. "45 43 1985 European Directive, supra note 7, art. 6. The key provisions of the European Directive present interesting similarities and differences with American law. A brief summary is useful.
Article 1 places liability on the producer for damage caused by a defect in his or her product. In addition, a product may be defective in its "presentations," which includes packaging, labeling and directions for use. See id. Therefore, failure to warn of potential dangers wiII be actionable. 15. In most American jurisdictions, this defense is available in failure to ,varn cases. 44 See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. i (1964).
[d.
Professor Marshall Shapo argues that the European Directive "projects a conception of strict liability that is, if anything, more extensive and consumer biased than virtually any American
The attempt by the EU to harmonize the products liability law of the Member States should inform the American national debate on products liability. The European Directive recognizes that defective products can cause extensive harm to individual consumers. 46 Without the European Directive, however, the legal position of an injured person varies according to the legal standards of the individual Member States. 47 The European Directive establishes one standard, strict liability, as the common denominator for consumer product safety.48 Significantly, it also adopts the consumer expectations test as the standard for determining product safety. 49 Much of the scholarly criticism heaped on the American consumer expectations test might be avoided by focusing on what the consumer is entitled to expect, rather than on what the particular user actually knows or expects in either a literal or idiosyncratic sense. Once the emphasis is on the consumer's entitlement to certain product safety expectations, the consumer-oriented standard becomes quite workable. The consumer could establish the entitled expectation from a number of sources, including the following: (a) manufacturer's representations;50 (b) governmental safety regulations;51 (c) industry standards and guidelines; (d) information in the public domain; or (e) general community information concerning products. The importance of this consumer-oriented approach is that it establishes the consumer viewpoint as the starting point for product liability analysis. This is more than a matter of mere semantics. Historically, reasonable consumer safety concerns have been and should remain the primary concern of products liability law. 54 Economic concerns should have only secondary significance. 55 At a minimum, consumers are entitled to an expectation that manufacturers, as experts in the field, will sell products which are as safe as possible, given technological and scientific feasibility.56 At the same time, consumers are not entitled to expect product safety if harm is caused by product uses or misuses which the consumer knows or should have known to be unreasonably dangerous. 57
Defect and consumer use issues must be determined according to the state of the art, that is, the scientific and technological knowledge available at the time the product is marketed. 58 To a significant extent, this approach recognizes that the product user and the product producer have reciprocal obligations concerning product safety.59 In other words, if the product defect actually causes a safety hazard, product manufacturers should be held responsible for foreseeable harm unexpected by consumers.60 However, product users ought to be held re- 54 sponsible for injuries resulting from product uses which they recognize or should recognize to create unreasonably dangerous risks. 61
These reciprocal safety responsibilities are promoted by the prevailing consumer-oriented test employed in manufacturing defect cases. 62 Despite a manufacturer's non-negligent efforts and the reasonableness of these efforts, production errors can cause accidents. 63 Even if a manufacturer could demonstrate that he or she had exercised the highest possible care, societal attitudes have evolved to create the expectation that consumers are entitled to expect basic physical integrity in products: the soda pop bottle should not explode; food should not be contaminated. 64 Reasonable consumer expectations are protected in part because the consumer is entitled to the basic product safety for which he or she pays.65 Consumer autonomy is preserved by the current approach. 66 Some scholars argue that application of this consumer-oriented analysis to warning and design cases is unworkable and ineffective. 67 Focusing on reasonable consumer entitlement to expectations, rather than idiosyncratic knowledge, becomes crucial. Although design decisions cannot be expected to ensure absolute product safety, it is, nevertheless, essential to use consumer expectancy as the starting point of analysis. If the focus is on the safety the consumer is entitled to expect, the determination of entitlement necessarily takes into account the product design, including directions and warnings, technologically and scientifically possible at the time of manufacture. 68 Reasonable product users would not believe they are entitled to have manufacturers pay for their negligent or unforeseeable conduct in using products. 69 Similarly, reasonable consumers would not believe that manu-facturers could produce products beyond the safety possible under the scientific and technological knowledge available at the time of product design and manufacture.
7o
Professor James Henderson argues that the consumer expectations test permits the marketplace to decide the degree of safety which should be designed into the product. 71 In applying the consumer expectations test to design defects, courts do not evaluate the design itself. 72 Instead, courts require manufacturers to fully disclose product risks so as to permit consumers to make informed decisions about the amount of product safety to purchase. 73 If the consuming public wants certain safety features, manufacturers will respond to market demands. 74 On the other hand, products with too many safety features will not sell, 'ultimately driving them from the market. 75 As a result, the consumer-oriented test might prove quite effective in design cases.
76 Admittedly, courts may not be equipped to evaluate the complicated scientific data inherent in product design choices. If courts cannot develop and apply meaningful design standards, ultimately cases will be decided by the whim of individual juries. 77 Such inconsistent jury verdicts promote neither safety nor efficiency. Nevertheless, employing a risk-utility balancing test does not insure that every jury will reach the same design conclusion about the effectiveness of a particular product. 78 Redesigning complex products according to the whims of conflictingjury decisions is unworkable. 79 However, this concern is an issue of process or procedure rather than the result of employing a particular definition of product defect. 80 Similar arguments apply to defective marketing or failure to warn cases. If warnings and instructions are overly detailed, increasing product price without corresponding safety improvement, consumers eventually will refuse to pay for this "unnecessary" safety.8l On the other hand, if additional warnings and instructions result in useful safety information, consumers may be willing to bear the expense. 82 In this sense, stronger warnings complement stronger product designs. 83 Ultimately, the manufacturer is responsible for producing a safe product, while the consumer is responsible for using that product safely. If the consumer expectations standard is viewed from this entitlement perspective, the standard requires the product user to be responsible for harm resulting from product uses falling below the norm to be expected of reasonable product safety.84 Some scholars argue that products liability law should not entertain arguments concerning consumer user responsibility, because "contributory negligence" principles have no place in strict liability analysis. 85 However, consumer expectations about safety entitlement demand that individual consumers, rather than manufacturers or the entire consuming population, be responsible for their own errors and risk-taking in using products. 86 Moreover, in cases in which responsibility for the product accident is shared by both the manufacturer and the consumer, comparative fault principles should apply.87
BOThe exploration of these procedural issues is beyond the purview of this article. However, areas to be looked at include expanded review of the role of the judge in keeping questionable cases from the jury, alternative dispute resolution, and expert panels. 
II. THE CREATION OF CONSUMER EXPECTATIONS
Product accidents occur because the manufacturer, the user, or both have imperfect knowledge about the product, its use and the user's level of knowledge. 88 Both manufacturers and users have concrete expectations about both the ability of consumers to use products safely and the degree of safety responsibility attributable to manufacturers or consumers. In effect, then, the consuming public possesses basic expectations about both consumer norms of conduct and manufacturer safety responsibility.89
To a significant degree, manufacturers create consumer safety expectations through product labeling and advertising. 90 The manufacturer who makes false statements about his or her product (even though made non-negligently, or even innocently) creates legitimate and reasonable consumer expectations which merit protection. 91 In effect, the manufacturer makes the statements to induce consumers to purchase the product. 92 Safety information provided by the manufacturer is justifiably important to consumers.93 This is especially true when the harm created by the product defect creates a "surprise element of danger."94 Consumers reasonably rely on the manufacturer's expertise and integrity in making safety promises. 95 Absent these promises, individual consumers might invest in independently obtaining more product information. 96 Moreover, consumers actually pay for quality control or other safetyassurance procedures in the product price. 97 Consequently, manufacturers should be required to pay for false safety representations which cause injury.98 Anything less results in the consumer losing both the 88 benefits of his or her bargain and his or her bargaining autonomy.99 Therefore, all manufacturer product representations, including labels and advertisements, should be considered in determining the safety expectations to which the consumer is entitled. lOO Consumers also have a generalized understanding that governmental regulations mandate consumer safety.lOl The media and governmental entities, as well as manufacturers, may disseminate information about such governmental regulations,102 as well as voluntarily adopted industry standards. lo3 Clearly, the manufacturer's affirmative obligation to provide consumers "with product information which warns of dangers or instructs about safe use depends on the general availability of this information. 104 If such information is already known to the reasonable consumer, there is no reason for the manufacturer to provide it. However, if the information is not known, or if the defect which creates harm is latent or hidden, the manufacturer should warn consumers. 105 Consumers are entitled to such information because they reasonably expect manufacturers will discover fores~eable product risks and will warn consumers about them. 106 The issue of presumed knowledge creates troublesome issues for this consumer-oriented analysis. Even if product risks are neither known nor discoverable, given the state of the art (scientific and technological knowledge) at the time of sale, allocation of responsibility for resulting accidents can still be assigned from a COnsumer expectation view-point. I07 Unlike the previously discussed situations in which the manufacturer affirmatively makes representations of product safety, the manufacturer now remains silent.
See generaUy
IOS Arguably, such silence cannot create false expectations of product safety, unless it is assumed that consumers believe, and are entitled to believe, the false concept that all product risks are discoverable prior to marketing. 109 Nevertheless, the manufacturer still profits at the expense of the injured consumer from a product containing unknowable or undiscoverable product defects. 110 As a result, it may be inherently equitable to force the manufacturer to pay even for such undiscoverable product risks. II1 Since the manufacturer profits from the product, he or she should pay the entire cost of producing that product, including accident costs. ll2 Moreover, the consumer cannot discover these unknowable or undiscoverable risks either.1l3
On the other hand, consumer expectations may be quite different. Consumers know that the world contains many unknown or undiscoverable dangers and that those who seek the benefits of innovative products may encounter such risks.
114 For example, the media informs consumers on an almost daily basis of newly discovered side effects of over-the-counter and prescription drugs. Consumers generally want the benefits of scientific and technological advancements, and realize that unknowable risks might be encountered. 115 Therefore, the consumer harmed by an unknowable product design defect may not be entitled to an expectation of safety.116
At the same time, manufacturing defects or flaws disappoint the very consumer expectations which consumers are entitled to expect (in large measure because the manufacturer expressly created those expectations), and which products liability law must therefore protect. ll7 Understandably, when the consumer purchases a product, he or she pays for its qualities, including safety, common to each product unit made according to the same design. us In other words, the consumer is entitled to expect his or her product to be as safe as other units of that same product. u9 If the consumer receives a product with a dangerous manufacturing flaw, his or her reasonable expectations are thwarted. At a minimum, consumers are entitled to expect that a product does not contain atypical flaws, and that it minimally meets the manufacturer's own specifications and requirements. 120 This focus on consumer expectations in manufacturing defect cases is equitable given the manufacturer's control of product safety.l2l The manufacturer establishes the level of quality control, designs the product, and generally possesses greater safety information. 122 On the other hand, the consumer bears responsibility for actual product use. 123 For example, if the consumer chooses to use a product which is obviously dangerous 124 or if he or she uses the product in a highly unusual and undiscoverable product defects is immoral, violating the basic purpose of the tort system. See Owen 123 Jd. at 901 ("Implicit in the machine's presence on the market ... was a representation that it would safely do the jobs for which it was built. ... To establish the manufacturer's liability it was sufficient that plaintiff proved that he was injured while using the Shopsmith in a way it was intended to be used . .. . n) (emphasis added).
124 See Pressley v. Sears-Roebuck & Co., 738 F.2d 1222, 1223-24 (11th Cir. 1984) (under Georgia unintended manner, he or she has no legitimate expectation of safety.l25 As a result, the consumer, rather than a potential product defect, has caused the harm. 126 Fundamentally, the manufacturing defect affects a small percentage of litigated cases. 127 As a result, the manufacturer can treat the manufacturing defect as an unfortunate aberration or departure-the product line, as a whole, remains free from condemnation as being defective. 128 By contrast, design defects condemn the entire product line. 129 Defectively designed products are constructed and manufactured according to the manufacturer's intended specifications; nevertheless, the product contains an inherent danger. 13o The defectively designed product fails to perform intended functions safely, creates dangerous contraindications or side effects,131 or fails to minimize foreseeable injury in the event of accident.
Unfortunately, classifying product defects as manufacturing, design or marketing defects (defective warnings and instructions) often proves a futile and ineffective analytical exercise. Some American cases and the European Directive treat warning defects as a type of design defect. 132 Warning defects, like design defects, exist in the entire product line, while manufacturing or production flaws are atypical. 133 Moreover, design and warning flaws may overlap. For example, a paydozer law, there is no liability for failing to equip riding lawn mowers with a deadman switch since 128The main manufucturing defect tests, "deviation from the norm" and the "malfunction theory" indicate that the defective product is an unfortunate exception to the rest of the product line.
129Because the design defect affects each unit of production, "questions related to 'design defects' and the determination of when a product is defective, because of the nature ofits design, appear to be the most agitated and controversial issues before the courts in the field of products liability. which lacks rear-view mirrors and back-up warning signals could be considered defectively designed, or the redesign could be viewed as providing adequate warnings. 134 Design and production defects also may overlap or coincide. For example, a worker is injured when he or she slips on hydraulic fuel which has leaked into the operator's compartment of a roof-bolter machine. An expert concludes that such leaks are ''virtually inevitable," but that the injury risk could be eliminated either by installing a floor grating or by putting the hydraulic valve outside the operator's compartment. 135 In this situation, oil leakage could be viewed as a random or atypical manufacturing defect. On the other hand, if such leakage is a "virtual inevitability," a design defect involving the entire product line exists. 136 Deciding the design defect on a negligence-based risk/utility analysis and the manufacturing defect on the consumer expectation standard becomes unworkable and doctrinally indefensible. Applying the consumer expectations test protects the reasonable product safety expectations to which such workers are entitled. 137
Consumer expectancy analysis can be useful in many warning situations as well. An analogy to medical informed consent is illustrative. The consumer and the patient both know what warnings are necessary for informed safety decision-making, whether in the medical context or in the products liability situation. Medical malpractice law can teach significant lessons. In the context of informed consent, the law focuses on what the patient needs to be told in order to reach the informed consent decision. 138 In the products arena, the consumer often knows what information he or she needs in order to use the product safely.139
The availability of expert testimony may be important in these situations. l4O In the case of prescription drugs, warnings are made directly to physicians as learned intermediaries. l41 Courts have recognized that 134 expert testimony may be required to explain issues "with respect to which laymen can have no knowledge at all. "142 Some scholars argue that the consumer expectations test is only an effective approach for manufacturing or production defects. I43 Clearly, the average consumer can understand that a foreign object in food or an exploding soda bottle does not meet ordinary safety expectations. On the other hand, many scholars argue that the consumer expectations test may not be useful in warning cases. I44 However, this argument may take too limited a view of consumer capabilities.
Basically, the consumer expectations test asks whether the product's safety conforms to what a reasonable consumer expects. I45 If the product does not so conform, it is defective. I46 Scholars recognize a number of problems with this test. 147 They argue that consumer expectations may be too high, too low or even non-existent because the consumer is particularly cynical, knowledgeable, or risk-averse. I48 These criticisms may focus too much on idiosyncratic or subjective consumer knowledge, rather than on what the reasonable consumer understands and expects. Obvious dangers present the archetypical situation. For example, because a punch press without a safety device presents an obvious danger to the consumer, it might be considered non-defective. Nevertheless, a consumer may be entitled to expect a product to be safe even if, as currently designed, it contains an obvious flaw. I49 Similarly, the argument that the consumer can have no expectation of product safety with respect to obvious danger is misplaced. A consumer can expect product safety even when exposed to obvious danger. I50 By analogy, obvious workplace dangers which are known to the employee are nonetheless actionable under federal and state labor laws. I51 If a product meets government safety standards, this could provide evidence of safety expectations to which the consumer is entitled. I52 At the other extreme, scholars argue that consumers cannot have expectations about products involving complicated design issues. I53 Requiring expert testimony can overcome these problems even in complicated design situations. Juries often benefit from expert testimony in modern civil and criminal litigation. Expert testimony should be used as readily in products liability cases as in manufacturing defect cases. I54 Some scholars argue that the consumer-oriented test requires some risk/utility balancing because courts must still determine whether such expectations are reasonable. I55 Nevertheless, the essence of the consumer expectations test is whether the product would be merchantable if the market knew of the danger. Significant policy considerations support retention of the consumer-oriented test. If risk/utility analysis is viewed as essentially identical to the theory of unreasonableness of risk in negligence law, strict liability is thwarted. To the extent that this is true, strict liability "failure to warn" cases also become indistinguishable from negligence cases.
A major controversy in American products liability centers on misuse, especially the question of whether misuse should be an affirmative defense or part of the plaintiff's prima facie case. I56 A cogent application of the consumer expectations test requires that it be an affirmative defense. Misuse consists of two components: plaintiff conduct and manufacturer foreseeability of such conduct. I57 In negligence actions, the plaintiff bears burdens of production and persuasion regarding defendant conduct, while the defendant carries these burdens for plaintiff conduct. I5s Strict products liability actions should be less burdensome for the plaintiff than traditional negligence. Requiring the plaintiff to establish the absence of misuse is burdensome, inconsistent and counterproductive. Therefore, plaintiff misuse should be an affirmative defense.
The main argument against this position is that intended use, the opposite of misuse, is part of the plaintiffs prima facie case. 159 As a result, the plaintiff must establish that the product is defective when used in the intended and/or foreseeable manner. I60 From this perspective, misuse becomes an issue of proximate cause. Since proximate cause is part of the plaintiffs burden of proof, by logical extension, misuse becomes part of the plaintiffs burden as well. I61 A similar result is reached by decisions which focus on misuse in the context of causation in fact.162 In this analysis, misuse becomes a superseding cause of injury. This concept is exemplified by the case of 
III. THE EUROPEAN DIRECTIVE AND LITIGATION REALITIES
The European Directive seeks to promote integration of Member State markets by providing a uniform standard of product liability safety: strict liability. 165 Although the European Directive mandates that strict liability form the basis for producer (manufacturer) liability, it is unlikely that this will result in the development of products liability law similar to the American experience. Most ED Member States are civil law countries, without a strong tradition of case law creating substantial legal change. England, legislation holds the primary position over case law. 167 Moreover, European litigants face disincentives to litigation, including the cost of retaining counsel in light of the prohibition of contingent fees. l68 Most significantly, juries will not decide product liability disputes. 169 AB a result, the development of strict product liability will have a uniquely European perspective. European adoption of strict liability for defective products need not result in an American-style litigation explosion.1 70 CONCLUSION The abandonment of the consumer expectations test may be shortsighted and imprudent. Although it has become commonplace to criticize the consumer expectations test, these critiques apparently ignore the fact that a central and paramount purpose of products liability law is the protection of legitimate consumer safety expectations. Encouraging product development and innovation merits attention. However, such innovation neither compels nor should compel a move to a manufacturer-oriented negligence standard which defeats legitimate, bargained-for consumer expectations. These legitimate products liability goals are promoted by the European Directive.
